The Peltzman Effect: Why Your Safety Systems Might Be Making Your Workplace Dangerous
- Andrew Middler
- Mar 15
- 4 min read
In my role, I have the ability to sit and discuss risk controls with clients almost every day. Lately, this has led to discussions about what is actually working, and that many clients don’t see lowering of incident rates, although they are proactive in their safety systems.
It leads to the inevitable discussion about “common sense” and that if we removed some of the safety controls, people might realise that things can go wrong, work with more caution and follow established safe systems of work. What I didn’t know is that this has been studied and is called the “Peltzman Effect”.
What is the Peltzman Effect?
The Peltzman Effect1. was first introduced by economist Sam Peltzman in his study titled “The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation”, published in the Journal of Political Economy in 19752. In the late 1960’s, new automobile safety measures such as seatbelt mandates and improved car safety technologies had been introduced, and Peltzman wanted to study whether these measures would lead to decreases in automobile death rates. Ultimately, Peltzman found that there was no decrease in automobile death rates and theorized that this was because drivers felt safer and therefore were more likely to make riskier driving decisions, which consequently increased the likelihood of a car crash occurring. This theory later came to be known as the Peltzman Effect.
After Peltzman published his 1975 paper, several other researchers also conducted related studies on risk behaviour. For example, John Adams, a geography professor at University College London, published a study in 1981 on the impact of seat belts on highway fatalities, in response to the British government’s consideration of implementing a seat belt law. According to Adams, “It appears that measures that protect drivers from the consequences of bad driving encourage bad driving. The principal effect of seat belt legislation has been a shift in the burden of risk from those already best protected in cars, to the most vulnerable, pedestrians and cyclists, outside cars.” Along with Peltzman’s findings, these other findings relating to how risk perception affects behaviour were grouped together under the concept of “risk compensation”. Extending on Peltzman’s findings, risk compensation is currently used to describe how people adjust their behaviours based on their perception of risk, with people tending to be more careful when we believe there is greater risk, and less careful when we feel that we are protected.
What the Peltzman Effect looks like in Construction and Manufacturing.
The Peltzman Effect creates a false sense of security that can lead to a drift between 'work as planned' and 'work as done'. This is when a system slowly moves toward a breaking point because everyone assumes the "safety systems" have everything under control.
Let’s look at what can occur when workers over rely on everyday safety systems.
1. Movement of Powered Mobile Plant
a. The operator thinks the reverse alarm can be heard by everyone, and over time, reduces how often they turn and look over their shoulder or use their mirrors. The worker on foot hears multiple different reversing alarms all day and doesn’t know which machines are actually in reverse. Outcome: The worker was struck by a reversing machine, even though all engineering controls were operating correctly.
2. Working at Heights
a. Worker wears a harness, tied off to an appropriate anchor point and steps out onto an area where they slip and fall. They are now hanging, caught by their harness, in an area where recovery is almost impossible. Outcome: Worker suffers permanent disability from their suspension trauma.
b. The company brings in a 100% tool hook up (tethering) policy, and workers become complacent about dropped objects. Outcome: Bystander struck by falling materials.
3. Work Adjacent to Roads (moving vehicles)
a. Traffic management is implemented which reduces the road speed to 40km/h, single lane shuttle (one lane at a time). Workers become accustomed to vehicles coming one direction at a time and don’t check both directions. Outcome: Worker is struck by a vehicle travelling the opposite direction.
It is easy to look at each of these and say, “yes but other controls are missing” and this is true. We should separate plant from people, other methods implemented to work at heights and hold all traffic for people to pass; however, these controls and many more just like them are over relied upon and fail on our work sites every day.
What can we do?
We need to remind people that the danger is still there. In the 1990s, some traffic engineers in Europe began removing signs, curbs, and traffic lights in a concept called “Shared Space.”3. By making the road feel less safe, drivers became hyper-aware, looked pedestrians in the eye, and slowed down. Accidents dropped. Sometimes, making things “look dangerous” is the safest thing you can do.
Stop marking everything as “low risk” in your risk assessments. Some activities are inherently high-risk and outlining them as such brings a level of seriousness into the workers minds. The law asks that the risk be reduced “so far as is reasonably practicable”. After all reasonably practicable controls are in place, if a task remains high-risk, have methods in your procedures for the control and authorisation of this high-risk work. Changing the colour of the box on your risk matrix doesn’t lower the actual risk!
If we want to counteract the feeling of invincibility, we need to encourage a culture where people can call out “near misses” without fear. Investigate all near misses like an actual incident, looking to see if complacency and the Peltzman Effect was at play. Near misses are your “free hits” and should be seen as a chance to stop a far more catastrophic incident from occurring.
Details sourced from:
March 2026